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Abstract 
By the mid-twentieth century, musical instrument manufacturing had become an increasingly 
mechanized activity. Craft skills had been displaced in many areas, yet remained a vital 
source of competitive advantage in local and international markets and were particularly 
valued by professional musicians.  This paper examines the contrasting experiences of two 
British musical instrument manufacturers, tracing the unfolding relationship between their 
pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities and capability development. Boosey & Hawkes, a 
large, well-established manufacturing and publishing company, was an early pioneer while 
Paxman Bros, a small musical retailer, transformed itself into one of the world’s most 
respected specialist manufacturers. The narrative probes the factors that shaped decision-
making in these companies as they developed a series of design innovations for one of the 
more complex brass instruments, the French horn.  It examines how a dynamic interaction 
between opportunity and capability, coupled with unanticipated contingencies, contributed to 
divergent outcomes for each company. 
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‘Imagined Outcomes’: Contrasting Patterns of Opportunity, Capability and Innovation 
in British Musical Instrument Manufacturing, 1930-1985 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the contrasting experiences of two British musical instrument 
manufacturers, tracing the unfolding relationship between their pursuit of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and capability development.  In doing so, it seeks to contribute to recent 
theorizing in this area.  In a 2013 issue of this journal, Daniel Raff encouraged business 
historians to give greater consideration to methodological issues1, and in particular to adopt a 
more forward-looking perspective that he described as, ‘a history of choices rather than 
outcomes’2.  The limitations of retrospective accounts are well-rehearsed3, and have 
prompted recent calls for greater sensitivity towards the ways in which people, ‘experience 
and behave in time’4.  These arguments have obvious implications for historical research on 
the impact of entrepreneurial processes, where actors are making ‘new investments in 
innovation’ under conditions of uncertainty5. They also go to the heart of recent efforts to (re-
) conceptualize ‘entrepreneurial opportunity’, which has resulted in a proliferation of 
literature in the fields of organization studies, entrepreneurship and business history6.   
 
Contributors to a recent Special Issue7 of the journal Business History examine 
entrepreneurship and the pursuit of opportunity in different periods and industry sectors, 
illustrating both the explanatory potential of historically-informed analysis, and the 
difficulties that can arise from a retrospective examination of such fleeting, diffuse and 
emergent phenomena8.  As the Special Issue editors suggest, the growing interest in process-
based, interpretive historical methods on the part of entrepreneurship scholars creates space 
for a more constructive dialogue with business historians9.  However, there are substantial 
obstacles to be overcome.  Several of the contributions identify flaws in the ‘discovery’-based 
approach to entrepreneurial opportunity that has prevailed in the mainstream entrepreneurship 
literature, citing inter alia a lack of engagement with temporal and spatial complexity and an 
associated tendency to abstract from its emergent properties.  More specifically, Roscoe et al. 
introduce the concept of ‘material agency’ and deploy actor network theory to address what 
they describe as the, ‘historical and material specificity of the entrepreneurial process’10, 
while Popp and Holt argue that the, ‘lived experience’ of this kind of entrepreneurial activity, 
‘is better conceived of as an imaginative and historically embedded process.’11   
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In this paper, we seek to connect these insights into the entrepreneurial process by revisiting 
two earlier theoretical works: Edith Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm and 
Dorothy Leonard-Barton’s Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources 
of Innovation.  Our theoretical framing draws on the Penrosean ‘productive services’ / 
‘productive opportunities’ dynamic and related elements of her ‘single argument’12. It also 
makes reference to G.L.S. Shackle’s closely-related subjectivist insights and to Leonard-
Barton’s analysis of ‘core capabilities’, ‘core rigidities’, highlighting their relationship with 
firm-level knowledge flows and innovations.  We use the resulting framework to trace the 
closely-linked processes of opportunity recognition and exploitation in a particular historical 
setting. The historical narrative is located in the world of brass musical instrument 
manufacturing in the mid-20th century.  Boosey & Hawkes was a large and well-established 
incumbent, created through the merger in the early 1930s of two of the largest instrument 
makers. The company had been responsible for an early design innovation in the French horn, 
a technically-complex brass instrument that was supplied into two distinct market segments, 
military bands and classical orchestras.  By the end of the Second World War, Boosey & 
Hawkes had acquired all of the existing British horn manufacturers, while its main rivals in 
Continental Europe had yet to recover from the hostilities.  How was this company 
effectively displaced in the international market for this instrument by a much smaller 
London-based musical instrument business, Paxman Bros, which had no prior product design 
and only very limited manufacturing experience13? The narrative reveals how Paxman Bros 
developed new capabilities that gave rise to a series of innovations in horn design that led to a 
succession of new models. Paxmans’ technological and market base combined traditional 
artisanal skills and values with entrepreneurial bricolage14 and the formation of close, 
collaborative relationships with leading musicians. The resulting interactions contributed to 
its emerging role as a leading specialist manufacturer at the forefront of innovation in this 
sector.   
 
In the next section we elaborate on the theoretical framing of the study. This is followed by a 
brief overview of the disparate and diverse literature relating to musical instrument 
manufacturing and other sources that are drawn upon in the main empirical study. We then 
introduce the historical narrative, which examines the experiences of the principal actors in 
each company in parallel, reconstructing the unfolding of a series of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and the contrasting ways in which they were acted upon through the 
development of particular, firm-specific technological and organisational capabilities. The 
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remaining sections comprise a discussion of emerging themes and a conclusion that identifies 
the main contributions of the study and reflects on its wider implications. 
 
Theoretical framework – Penrosean dynamics and core capabilities 
 
Business historians have long acknowledged the potential applications of Penrosean learning. 
In an early review article, Galambos highlighted the way in which Penrose’s dynamic theory 
could be used to inform historical studies: “[A]s Penrose makes clear, it is the interaction 
between the material and human factors which is decisive in shaping an organization’s 
development.”15  More recently, Lazonick has highlighted her contribution, arguing that, 
‘more than any other economist in the post-Schumpeter generation, Penrose’s work 
elaborated the foundations of a theory of innovative enterprise’16.  Her contribution is now 
located within the broad post-Marshallian tradition that has addressed the interplay between 
human knowledge and the evolution of economic systems, yet despite a thorough grounding 
in orthodox neo-classical economics, she drew freely on related disciplines, including 
industrial organization17. Penrose encouraged her readers to consider The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm as a ‘single argument’, but for the purposes of this paper it is possible to 
highlight two elements that have the most direct application to our theme.  Firstly, Penrose 
introduced two vital distinctions, between ‘productive resources’ and the ‘productive 
services’ that they can render18, and between two categories of services: ‘managerial’ and 
‘entrepreneurial’19.  In developing this part of the argument, she also recognized how 
managerial decision-making over the deployment of resources provides a primary source of 
the uniqueness of each firm. Secondly, she introduced the concept of ‘subjective’ productive 
opportunity, which she defined as what a firm, ‘thinks it can accomplish’20, based on 
managerial interpretations of the environment in which it is operating, taking due account of 
its internal resources, operations and other influences.  There is a strong recursive dimension 
to this process, with the organizational framework of the firm providing the necessary 
environment for the ‘production’ of entrepreneurial services, and these services, in turn, 
becoming a ‘significant aspect’ of the firm’s changing productive opportunity. The subjective 
and forward-looking concept of productive opportunities has strong parallels with G.L.S. 
Shackle’s work on the central role of imagination in the entrepreneurial process, captured in 
his insight that, ‘men’s decisions are not choices among actual but among imagined 
outcomes’21. Even so, Penrose was at pains to emphasise the limits of subjectivism, both 
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acknowledging the ‘reality’ of the external selection environment and clarifying its temporal 
relationship to firm-level decision-making: 
 
“In the last analysis the ‘environment’ rejects or confirms the soundness of the judgements 
about it, but the relevant environment is not an objective fact discoverable before the 
event.”22  
 
In a Penrosean interpretation, the firm provides an institutional setting for conjecture and 
innovation that gives rise to a variety-generating dynamic. While gales of creative destruction 
might sweep away particular products or technologies, firms could learn and evolve by 
making ‘connections’ between their past activities and future options23.  It provided a, ‘kind 
of temporary evolutionary equilibrium’24, where managerial teams could conjecture over the 
application of productive services to particular opportunities. However, Penrose also 
recognized that the scope for conjecture was influenced by a firm’s ‘unique’ history, the 
managerial team’s perception of productive opportunities being itself shaped by previous 
experience and the shared interpretive frameworks that this had engendered. 
  
Leonard-Barton’s work on ‘core capabilities’ and ‘core rigidities’ provides a valuable 
complement to the Penrosean learning dynamic, while also making a direct connection to the 
innovation literature25.  Leonard-Barton identified core capabilities as a knowledge set, 
comprising employee knowledge and skills embedded in technical systems, that is directed 
by managerial systems and underpinned by values and norms, which provides a company’s 
competitive advantage.  She highlighted the ‘dual nature’26 of core capabilities, referring to 
the ways in which the value-creating activities can become institutionalized, taking the form 
of ‘core rigidities’ that have the effect of inhibiting subsequent knowledge flows and so 
hampering the innovation process.  Leonard-Barton identified a number of sources of path 
dependency, including skills and knowledge, organizational values, and physical and 
managerial systems that have served a company well in the past, but that may give rise to 
core rigidities in a changed product or market context.  This generates a necessary tension 
within the organization between innovation and the status quo, as managers struggle to 
maintain core capabilities yet simultaneously promote their renewal27. 
 
In the narrative, we trace the unfolding and recursive relationship between the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, capability development and innovation in two purposive, yet 
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socially-embedded businesses.  Our theoretical framing emphasizes the role of human 
imagination and the growth of knowledge, which enables organizational actors to become, 
‘makers and not mere executants of history’28.  As Loasby has noted, this distinctively human 
faculty to construct imagined futures is an essential prerequisite of innovation29.  However, in 
adopting a creative process perspective on entrepreneurial agency, we remain attentive both 
to its material specificity30 and to the role of human values, emotions and personal 
idiosyncrasies in shaping the outcome. 
 
The literature on musical instruments and instrument manufacturing 
 
Among the small number of business historical studies that deal specifically with musical 
instruments, Berghoff 31 examines the marketing of Hohner harmonicas as a differentiated 
global brand from the mid-19th century, while Carnevali and Newton32 address the changing 
relationship between piano manufacturers, retailers and consumers in Victorian Britain. 
Wallace’s33 detailed company history of Boosey and Hawkes provides useful insights into the 
company’s publishing interests but says little about instrument manufacturing.  Fortunately 
the latter is covered by two important contributions in the form of doctoral theses. A study by 
Brand34 analyses the company’s clarinet production while a recent study by Howell35 is more 
broadly based and analyses the manufacture of wind instruments as a whole.   
 
Of the studies addressing manufacturing practice, Bigio36 examines the leading instrument 
maker, Rudall, Carte & Co, but concentrates almost entirely on flutes, ignoring the brass 
instruments that formed an important part of its business. Rayna and Struikova37 provide a 
fascinating historical account of the dominance of incumbent electric guitar manufacturer, 
Gibson, being challenged by a highly innovative new entrant, Fender, in the period 1945-84. 
Though there are some parallels with the present study, much of the analysis focuses on 
patent records rather than the organization of production.  Lastly, it is worth noting that 
although biographies of the celebrated horn player Dennis Brain38 provide a few glimpses of 
horn makers in the twentieth century, comparatively little has been published about brass 
instrument makers and almost nothing has focused on producers of French horns. 
 
There is also an extensive specialist literature covering musical instruments in general and 
brass instruments in particular. The greater part of this material is concerned with detailed 
descriptions of the history, design and development of individual instruments, together with 
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the music written for them and issues relating to performance practice, rather than analysing 
the firms that produce and market them. The literature itself comprises chiefly books and a 
wide range of scholarly periodicals, including many published by learned societies39 devoted 
to specific instruments. Although some of these publications verge on hagiography, 
nonetheless they provide a wealth of background detail and technical information.  
 
Major works include Baines40, Montagu41 and Herbert and Wallace42, all of which are 
scholarly tracts, covering brass instruments. More specialised books dealing with specific 
instruments, include Humphries43, Morley-Pegge44, and Tuckwell45, all of which focus on the 
French horn. Accompanying these major works are more modest offerings comprising 
scholarly articles published in periodicals specialising in particular instruments or groups of 
instruments. These include a number that focus on brass instruments such as Bacon46, 
Giannini47, Humphries48, Myers49 and White and Myers50. While several of these works 
provide valuable background information including details of one of the two companies that 
form the basis of this study, they say little about the business of manufacturing and marketing 
musical instruments. 
 
In addition to drawing on this specialist literature, the following narrative is based on a series 
of interviews conducted with key informants, including the late Robert Paxman, former 
employees of both companies, professional and amateur horn players, musical instrument 
retailers, and curators of instrument collections, together with a range of archival sources. 
The latter included the business records of several leading brass instrument manufacturers, 
including Boosey & Co, Hawkes and Son, Rudall Carte & Co and Besson & Co, which 
provided details of production levels and methods over an extended period. 
 
Innovation of the French horn in Britain (1930-1985) 
 
For much of the 19th and a substantial part of the 20th century, British orchestras had a 
distinctive sound. This differentiated them from their counterparts in many parts of Europe 
and the United States. This sound was the product of the instruments they played, most 
notably in the horn section of the orchestra. In Britain, horn players typically utilized 
instruments modelled on the Raoux horn from France. This French horn had a narrow bore, a 
small bell and piston-operated valves.  Although more difficult to play and prone to ‘cracked 
notes’, this was the instrument that dominated horn playing in Britain for more than a 
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hundred years. However during the interwar years concert-goers in Britain started to 
experience a different sound. This emanated from foreign orchestras visiting Britain, who 
generally used a German horn rather than its French counterpart51. The German instrument 
used rotary valves instead of piston valves, had a wider bore and a larger flared bell. These 
features gave it a deeper, richer and louder sound. Although the leading British horn players 
of the time continued to adhere to the French version of the instrument, in the mid-1930s one 
of the leading British brass instrument manufacturers boldly stepped forward to produce the 
country’s first German horn.  
 
The German horn was to become a dominant design52 and the clear preference of professional 
players in Britain in the second half of the 20th century.  However, the course of this 
technological and market innovation was far from straightforward as British brass instrument 
manufacturers responded to competitive pressures and abrupt environmental changes from 
the mid-1930s onwards. In the event, a new entrant took the lead in refining the design and 
manufacture of the German instrument, while the original innovator appeared either 
unwilling or unable to develop its product range. By the end of the period, the incumbent had 
exited the industry, while the new entrant had become one of the world’s leading specialist 
horn makers.  The narrative traces the contrasting experiences of each company in turn, 
beginning with the established manufacturer, Boosey & Hawkes. 
 
The incumbent – Boosey & Hawkes 
Boosey & Hawkes was the product of a merger between the brass instrument manufacturers, 
Boosey & Co and Hawkes & Son in 1930. The merger came about through the dramatic 
decline in the market53 in the late 1920s that was the product of economic depression and 
changes in technology54. In the 1940s, concentration of the sector intensified as Boosey & 
Hawkes acquired the two remaining major brass instrument makers, Besson & Co and Rudall 
Carte & Co.  Hence, In the course of less than 20 years, Boosey & Hawkes effectively 
‘swallowed up’ the firms who had been their principal rivals in the late 19th century55 (see 
table 1). 
*********** 
Insert Table 1 
*********** 
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Prior to the merger, all four firms had been manufacturing French horns, with their London-
based factories each employing about a hundred staff. At this time, production methods relied 
heavily on traditional artisanal skills acquired through a lengthy apprenticeship in brass 
instrument making. All of the firms manufactured the French style narrow bore horn then 
favored by British horn players, alongside a variety of other brass instruments. Most firms 
produced horns for both the orchestral and military markets, though of the four, Hawkes & 
Son appears to have had a particularly strong relationship with the top professional horn 
players, who featured prominently in their contemporary promotional literature56 (see figures 
1 and 2). 
***************** 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 
***************** 
Founded in the early 19th century as a music publisher, Boosey & Co began making 
woodwind instruments in the 1850s. In terms of capabilities the firm’s skill base was initially 
limited, so much so that instruments were quite often bought in from other firms57, 
particularly small instrument workshops. However its range of capabilities expanded as 
Boosey & Co moved into brass instrument manufacturing in the 1870s following the 
acquisition of Distin & Co58. The attraction of brass instruments was the rapidly expanding 
brass band market in Britain at this time. Between 1870 and 1900 Boosey & Co’s sales to 
bands grew from 7 per cent of total sales to 32 percent59. However expansion was not without 
its problems, particularly in acquiring skilled craftsmen. Hence by 1900 around one third of 
the company’s one hundred craftsmen were of continental European extraction, and had 
learnt their trade abroad60. Surprisingly there was little specialization, with each worker 
required to make a range of instruments. 
Almost from the outset, Boosey & Co’s technical capabilities in manufacturing extended to 
innovation in product design. Initially, the company developed new woodwind instruments, 
the ‘Pratten’ flute in the 1860s and the ‘Clinton’ clarinet in the 1890s61. The firm’s factory 
manager David Blaikley62 played an important part in both innovations. He also developed 
and patented a number of important improvements in brasswind mechanisms. Although many 
of the innovations of Boosey & Co before the First World War were incremental, 
nevertheless a leading instrument specialist has noted that, ‘in the Blaikley era a well-
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informed and earnest endeavor to improve brass instrument design coupled with a high 
quality of workmanship gave the company a position of advantage’63.  
 
*********** 
Insert Figure 3 
*********** 
In 1935 Boosey & Hawkes launched the first wide bore German style64 horn to be produced 
in Britain (see figure 3). The new horn was designed in collaboration with, and possibly at the 
instigation of, Alan Hyde, a horn player in Sir Thomas Beecham’s London Philharmonic 
Orchestra.  Hyde was a powerful advocate of the German horn65, and the new design was 
modelled on a horn produced by Ed. Kruspe of Erfurt, one of Germany’s leading horn makers 
alongside Alexanders of Mainz66. The new horn incorporated rotary valves, a radical 
departure from the traditional ‘French-style’ piston valves that were used in British made 
horns at this time.  Many leading British horn players, including Aubrey Brain at the BBC 
Symphony Orchestra67 remained committed to the French style of narrow bore horn and 
initial sales of the new design were unsurprisingly modest (Table 2)68   But why did such a 
large and powerful incumbent fail to capitalize on this early innovation in the post-war 
period, when as a consequence of a combination of factors, German style horns were to 
become the instrument of choice for horn players in Britain?  To answer this question, we 
consider two distinct but related aspects of the company’s entrepreneurial and innovative 
activity. Firstly the growth of its international music publishing business, and secondly, the 
way that it reconfigured core manufacturing capabilities in response to changing 
technological and market environments.  
*********** 
Insert Table 2 
*********** 
More than just a publishing opportunity … 
At the time of the merger both Boosey & Co and Hawkes & Son combined music publishing 
and instrument manufacturing. However in terms of managerial capabilities, it was 
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significant that the main instigators of the merger, Leslie Boosey at Boosey & Co and Ralph 
Hawkes at Hawkes & Son, were each personally much more allied to the publishing side of 
the business, both having served as Directors of the Performing Rights Society69.  Boosey & 
Co, a much larger and wealthier company, had the bigger catalogue, which included a small 
number of British classical music composers, notably Edward Elgar and Gustav Holst, in 
addition to more popular ballad music70. Hawkes & Son was the junior partner in terms of 
music publishing, with a catalogue that owed more to ‘tin pan alley’ than serious classical 
music71. However the publishing side of the business was run by Ralph Hawkes, the younger 
of the two Hawkes brothers.  The 32 year old was a keen sportsman, active in winter sports 
and ocean racing, and was widely regarded as a more capable business leader than his older 
brother, Geoffrey, who subsequently took charge of the manufacturing side of the business. 
Ralph Hawkes combined powerful ambitions to promote contemporary classical music with 
the entrepreneurial drive and social skills to do something about it: the composer Aaron 
Copland later noted, ‘[h]is flair made up partly of business sense and the pleasure of 
association with creative personalities’72. Consequently at the company’s first board meeting 
late in 1930 the decision was taken to develop the company’s classical music catalogue73.   
Over the next ten years Ralph Hawkes pursued his mission to develop the company’s serious 
music catalogue in earnest. Although his most important early signing was the young British 
composer, Benjamin Britten, his efforts were especially focused on making the company’s 
music publishing an international enterprise74. Among those he signed during the course of 
the 1930s were the Hungarian composers Bela Bartok and Zoltan Kodaly75 and from 
America, Aaron Copland and Leonard Bernstein. Boosey & Hawkes opened a number of 
international offices, including an Australian company in 1934, and by the time war broke out 
in Europe in 1939, Ralph Hawkes was making plans to split the company, moving the 
publishing arm to New York while instrument manufacturing remained in London. The 
outbreak of war brought an end to these plans, but they surfaced again in the immediate 
postwar period when Hawkes was President of Boosey & Hawkes Inc and living in the East 
Coast town of Westport, Connecticut. Though these plans were not implemented following 
Ralph Hawkes’ premature death in 1950, they indicate the extent to which the international 
publishing side of the business had developed during his tenure. 
Mass market manufacturing  
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Boosey & Hawkes’ initial plans for instrument manufacturing, involved rationalization and 
consolidation, with both Leslie Boosey and Ralph Hawkes seeking ‘great savings’76 from 
combining and re-structuring this part of their business. In 1931 Boosey & Co’s entire 
instrument manufacturing business was transferred from Stanhope Place in Central London, 
to Hawkes & Son’s large, modern factory at Deansbrook Road in the north London suburb of 
Edgware77. The scale of the rationalization and the capacity reduction that these changes 
brought about is apparent from pre- and post-merger production figures. The merged 
company manufactured an average of 2,723 instruments per year in the period 1930-39, less 
than the 2,923 instruments per year that Boosey & Co alone produced during the preceding 
decade78. Having consolidated production facilities, the following year in 1932, Boosey and 
Hawkes introduced the Regent range of inexpensive popular instruments such as cornets, 
trumpets and trombones, which Myers describes as, ‘the first step toward mass production’79. 
Other cheap instruments introduced at this time included the Lafleur range. However 
probably the most significant step towards mass production took the form of a process 
innovation. This was the introduction in the mid-1930s of hydraulic forming for producing 
bends and loops in brass tubing. This was the brainchild of Arthur Blaikley, the son of David 
Blaikley, who was factory manager throughout the interwar period. Like his father, Arthur 
Blaikley was also an innovator, but whereas his father was responsible for product 
innovations in the form of new or improved instruments, David focused mainly on process 
innovations. He held a number of patents associated with machine tools80, but his most 
significant contribution was the introduction of the hydraulic expansion process forming 
bends of all types in brass tubing. As well as dramatically reducing the amount of time 
required to produce bends, it eliminated wrinkling on the inside. However, the capital 
investment and tooling costs for these machines could only be justified by a dramatically 
greater output of standardized instruments.  
*********** 
Insert Table 3 
*********** 
These developments in publishing and manufacturing left the company’s French horns as an 
increasingly marginalized area of activity. The technical complexity of the horn, combined 
with a relatively small market81 compared to those of simpler and more popular brass 
instruments like the trombone and the trumpet, meant it was not suited to high volume 
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production. Although batch sizes for these instruments increased during the second half of the 
1930s, they continued to be produced in relatively low volumes (see table 3), reflecting only 
modest progress towards mechanization82. 
 
*********** 
Insert Figure 4 
*********** 
During the Second World War, instrument production was confined to a small section of the 
Edgware factory as the company switched to the production of aircraft components and 
munitions for the war effort (see figure 4). War production brought investment in new 
machinery and the introduction of line production to the manufacture of standardized items 
comprising, ‘engine tubing, exhaust pipes and other stuff’83, for military aircraft. Increasingly 
unskilled machine operators, many of them women, replaced skilled craftsmen84. By the end 
of the war the Edgware factory had been transformed from traditional workshops producing 
hand-crafted instruments aided by a small amount of machinery into an industrial production 
system through the application of mass production methods85. The ending of hostilities saw 
the machinery adapted to instrument making, enabling the company to progress 
developments begun in the 1930s leading to mass production of low-priced models. As 
Howell86 notes this, ‘led to a complete change of ethos’ within the company. The increasing 
use of unskilled machine operators resulted in a diminishing role for skilled craftsmen. Batch 
sizes for popular instruments rose dramatically. Line production of trumpets began as early as 
1945 and other popular instruments followed in the early 1950s. Although output was 
initially slow to increase, during the course of the 1950s it rose rapidly with output of brass 
instruments increasing from 50 per week in 1946 to 600 per week in 195887. 
 
The company’s much enhanced manufacturing capability, in particular its ability to mass 
produce low-priced popular instruments complemented the dominance of the brass band 
market that it enjoyed following the acquisition of Besson & Co in 1948. Boosey & Hawkes 
were also helped by a resurgence of the brass band movement in the 1960s88.  As a small 
independent instrument maker with 40 years’ experience of the trade observed, ‘Brass band 
is its own little world. They [Booseys] had it to themselves…for a long time they had it all to 
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themselves’89. Instruments for schools and colleges also formed an important part of Boosey 
& Hawkes business at this time, helped by the rapid growth of music education in Britain in 
the 1950s90. Similarly lower costs through mass production enabled the company to export an 
increasing proportion of its output at this time, although many fewer brass instruments were 
exported than woodwind ones. 
 
However Boosey & Hawkes dominance of the brass band and education markets came at a 
price. According to Howell the advent of mass production led to falling standards of quality 
control as, ‘the company started to lose sight of the high standard of their top range 
instruments and the requirements of their professional customers’91. Professional players 
were put off by Boosey & Hawkes’ focus on the brass band and education markets. As the 
instrument maker quoted earlier observed, ‘There’s three markets in brass. There’s what we 
laughingly call legit, which is the classical, straight ahead, traditional market. There’s the 
commercial jazz/pop market … and there’s brass bands, a whole different world of their own 
– their own politics, their own instruments – and the two don’t meet’92.  As Howell notes ‘the 
harsh reality was that many British professional players favored instruments made abroad’93. 
The same author goes on to point out that Boosey & Hawkes’ high quality brass instruments 
were bought mainly by band musicians, only a very small proportion was used for orchestral 
playing94. This was especially true of horns. This most complex of brass instruments, did not 
lend it itself to mass production with the result that horn output languished, becoming 
confined to just two of the company’s remaining craftsmen (see table 2). 
 
Having pioneered the production of German horns in Britain in the 1930s, Boosey & Hawkes 
were unable to seize the opportunity and build on their initial product innovation. As the 
instrument maker quoted earlier put it, ‘Booseys were very good at piston valves stuff, brass 
band instruments, that was their thing…[but]…there’s a delicacy about a French horn, about 
the way it’s built and the balance of it and all that and Booseys couldn’t quite get their heads 
round it…they went at it like it’s a tuba’95. Not only did their horns fail to find favor with the 
traditional/classical market, professional musicians were deterred precisely because the brass 
band market was such an important part of Booseys’ business. As the interviewee noted, ‘…I 
think that’s where the French horn thing suffered. Not only was it just crudely made, but the 
traditional market couldn’t take Booseys seriously because they made brass band 
instruments’96.  
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Hence by the 1960s, French horns represented only a tiny fraction of Boosey & Hawkes’ 
output of brass instruments. The same horn, described in the instrument books as a ‘rotary 
horn’ and branded as the ‘Emperor’ model remained in production in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The company flirted with innovation in the mid-1960s by introducing a redesigned double 
horn, but as Howell notes, this proved to no avail97. Unlike other instruments batch sizes for 
horns remained very small and made by the same two craftsmen who had made them in the 
pre-war era. Then towards the end of the 1960s Boosey and Hawkes, stopped manufacturing 
their own rotary valves, thereby abandoning a key manufacturing capability. Instead valve 
clusters were outsourced98, a strategy the company increasingly relied on as it wrestled with 
what has been described as a ‘mind boggling’ range of instruments in its product portfolio99. 
Finally outsourcing was carried to its logical conclusion when in the 1970s, Boosey and 
Hawkes decided to outsource horn production in its entirety to the firm of Josef Lidl of 
Brno100, Identified as the ‘Model 400’ it was branded as a Boosey & Hawkes horn, though it 
was clearly inscribed ‘Made by Josef Lidl’ on the bell.  Lacking the cache of better known 
brands of orchestral horn101 it was rarely used by professional horn players and sales 
continued to be modest102 . The trigger for the outsourcing of horn production was apparently 
the retirement of one of the company’s two remaining horn makers. However in reality it was 
part of a broader trend whereby Boosey & Hawkes increasingly outsourced the production of 
instruments to countries like Czechoslovakia, Taiwan and Pakistan103 in the 1980s. This not 
only reflected a continued attempt to lower costs, but the company’s pursuit of acquisitions, 
especially overseas ones104. This in turn resulted in a lack of investment in the company’s 
core asset, the Edgware factory. The outdated plant combined with greater reliance on 
outsourcing meant further dilution of the Boosey & Hawkes brand.  
As Howell comments the company’s attention to the popular (i.e. brass band) and education 
markets was at the expense of its traditional customer base105. She notes how Boosey & 
Hawkes increasingly lost sight of its long-established professional customers and standards 
within the factory. By pursuing expansion and mass production the company, ‘lost its focus 
on craftsmanship, quality and custom-built instruments’106. Boosey & Hawkes decision to 
outsource horn production, represented a key turning point. It not only marked the exit from 
horn manufacturing of the last of the four incumbent horn makers who produced the 
instrument in the prewar era, it marked the loss of Boosey & Hawkes’ artisanal skills and 
technical capabilities in this field, which had accumulated over a hundred years. It was to 
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prove a prelude to the company’s eventual closure of its Edgware plant in 2001107 as it exited 
brass instrument manufacturing completely.  
The new entrant – Paxman Bros 
 
While the early years of the twentieth century saw the demise of small workshops making 
brass instruments as part of a move to factory production108, this trend began to reverse in the 
years after the Second World War. Among the first of a new generation of small brass 
instrument manufacturers was Paxman Bros of London, which specialized in the production 
of French horns. Unlike their predecessors who had made French style narrow bore horns 
fitted with piston valves, Paxmans chose to innovate109, by manufacturing a wide bore 
German style horn, an instrument that was becoming increasingly popular at the time. 
Paxmans started life as a retailer selling a range of musical instruments. Harry Paxman had 
ambitions to pursue a career as a professional clarinet player, but injuries sustained during the 
First World War, prevented this and instead he turned to selling musical instruments. The 
firm was founded as Paxman Bros in 1919 by Harry Paxman and his brothers William and 
Bertram, with premises in Southwark Street, near London Bridge110. Prominent among their 
customers were northern brass bands and military bands. Like many dealers in musical 
instrument the firm’s capabilities at this time extended beyond retailing and distribution to 
include metal-working skills associated with the maintenance and repair of brass instruments. 
For this purpose Harry Paxman, set up a workshop doing repairs111, and among his early 
clients for repair work were several military bands based at Aldershot112.  
Having initially sold a variety of musical instruments113, Paxmans began to specialize in brass 
instruments, including French horns. This increasing specialization is evident in its decision 
to become an agent for the Paris-based horn maker Courtois114 and in the way its 
advertisement in the Musicians Union Handbook for 1936 is located in the section listing 
professional horn players.  Bearing the strap line, ‘First Class Repairs’115, it indicates the 
firm’s developing capabilities in the field of repair work, which would subsequently open up 
the opportunity for its move into instrument manufacturing. 
In 1935 the firm relocated to new premises at 165 Shaftesbury Avenue116, in the heart of 
London’s theatre district. This move reflected the decline of the traditional brass band 
market117 during the depression of the early 1930s118, and Harry Paxman’s active role in 
17 
 
targeting sales of instruments to professional musicians including those playing in dance 
bands.  The move to Shaftesbury Avenue led to a new development for the firm, producing as 
well as selling and repairing instruments, a step that reflected its growing capability in terms 
of the technical skills and expertise of it staff.  Initially, production was confined to a single 
instrument, the sousaphone, which was popular with dance bands in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Lacking the necessary resources and capabilities to produce the instrument ab initio, Harry 
Paxman instead chose to improvise by modifying an existing brass instrument, the helicon119, 
which was of similar design. This involved substituting a larger forward facing bell for the 
somewhat smaller one found on helicons. However the firm’s capabilities at this time did not 
extend to the construction of the large flared bell of the sousaphone since its compound shape 
presented one of the most technically demanding challenges in brass instrument 
manufacturing120. Lacking the specialized skills and equipment needed to produce its own 
bells, Harry Paxman decided to seek out a sub-contractor. He again opted to improvise, but 
on this occasion approached one of his neighbors to help him out. According to his son, 
“…he got a company which spun cooking utensils for the trade – giant dustbin-type things – 
to produce flares [bells] and by making what amounts to a couple of right angle bends… the 
flares connected to the body of the thing with a bayonet arrangement and a locking nut”121.  
By pursuing this somewhat convoluted route, Paxmans became brass instrument 
manufacturers, albeit on a very small scale. With the onset of war in 1939, this experiment 
was discontinued and the firm had to fall back on repair work.   
In 1940, having been bombed out of during the blitz, Harry Paxman continued to repair 
instruments from his home in suburban Twickenham122. However as the war drew to a close, 
he returned to Central London, having acquired spacious new premises in Gerrard Street, 
Soho123. The new building provided space for an enlarged workshop, and Harry Paxman lost 
little time in seeking out skilled craftsmen in order to extend the firm’s capabilities. This 
posed a challenge since, ‘there was a shortage of skilled people around because of the war 
and the casualties and so on’ 124  Harry Paxman’s initial response was to draft one of his sons 
into the business in early 1945. At the time Robert Paxman was training to be a plumber, but 
Paxman senior was confident that his metal working skills were transferable to instrument 
making. Robert’s mother was also reluctant for him to take up plumbing on account of his 
weak chest, providing an additional prompt for this change of occupation125.  Harry Paxman 
was also successful in ‘poaching’ three skilled craftsmen from Boosey & Hawkes at this 
point: Harry Page, Charles Staneford and Joe Dobson were all experienced, time-served brass 
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instrument makers.  Now, with five employees in the workshop126, there was scope not just to 
repair and adapt instruments127, but also to resume manufacturing.  Building on the firm’s 
pre-war reputation as something of a specialist in horns128, Harry Paxman was keen to begin 
making this instrument.  
Paxman decided to produce a German style horn, recognizing both the increasing popularity 
of this wide bore design, especially among younger horn players, and the fact that the two 
leading manufacturers of high quality horns, Alexander and Kruspe, were German companies 
and unlikely to offer serious competition in the immediate aftermath of the conflict129.  This 
ambitious step presented significant challenges, despite the progress that the firm had made in 
developing its capabilities, especially in traditional artisanal skills associated with metal work 
techniques and brass instrument making. The biggest challenge was the manufacture of valve 
clusters. This was especially difficult since German style horns employ rotary valves rather 
than the piston valves normally found on British made horns at this time. Morley-Pegge130 in 
his definitive study of the horn notes that rotary valves are significantly more complex 
mechanically. As a former Paxman employee noted, ‘… a rotary valve French horn is a 
much more delicate piece of kit’131.  In Germany the smaller horn makers, whose scale of 
production was insufficient to justify the capital investment in precision machining that was 
required, could source their rotary valves from third parties.  However, in Britain this option 
was out of the question since there were no specialist valve manufacturers132.  
Harry Paxman came up with a novel solution to the problem of acquiring this substantive 
capability. In a classic piece of entrepreneurial bricolage, he persuaded two machinists to 
‘moonlight’ from their day job at the local gas board. As his son133 put it, ‘…we were 
fortunate enough regarding the bells and the valves, to engage on a part time basis, normally 
on a Saturday, these people to come in and produce things’. Neither had any prior experience 
of musical instruments, but they were employed to carry out precision machining of 
prototype gas fittings and their metalworking skills were transferable, since the tight 
tolerances needed to produce rotary valve clusters were very similar to those needed for gas 
fittings134. In time one of them joined the company on a full time basis135. Nor was this the 
only example of improvisatory techniques being used in order to facilitate the production of 
horns. For example, Robert Paxman explained  how his father, ‘… became associated with a 
general engineer who lived in Hampton in Middlesex, only a relatively short distance from 
where my father lived, and he got him to knock up a mandrel’136.  
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Having acquired the capabilities necessary not just to adapt and convert instruments but to 
manufacture them as well, Paxmans began producing its first horns. These were essentially 
copies of the Alexander 103 horn, a logical choice given that as one interviewee noted, 
‘...Alexanders were the principal suppliers to the profession from before the war 137’.  
However the company’s initial output was very modest. By 1948, three years after production 
started, the firm’s annual output had only just crept into double figures138. Despite this, the 
firm’s capabilities were clearly improving as it was establishing a reputation for its rotary 
valves. The leading British horn player, Dennis Brain made extensive use of Paxmans139. On 
several occasions in the late 1940s Paxmans modified horns for Brain including fitting 
additional rotary valves. A letter from the horn player to Paxmans praises the firm’s ‘expert 
workmanship’140.  
During the course of the 1950s the firm’s capabilities in terms of instrument manufacturing 
were gradually extended. A catalogue for the mid-1950s describes the firm as, ‘specialist 
makers of Rotary Valve Horns and Repairers of Horns of all descriptions and rotary valve 
work’141. In terms of capabilities a degree of specialization had developed around three key 
craftsmen. Robert Paxman made bells while Fred Leach was ‘the valve man’142. Having 
perfected the machining and turning of rotary valves, he was now able to craft very high 
quality valve blocks. The third person was Ted Adams, the horn builder. Unlike the others, he 
was himself a horn player, which meant that as well as being, ‘a really good craftsman’, he 
was someone who, ‘really cared about making beautiful horns’143. This small close-knit team 
of craftsmen, each of whom contributed in a different way, was to form the cornerstone of 
Paxmans’ horn manufacturing capability over more than thirty years. However, for much of 
the 1950s horn manufacture remained almost a sideline, attracting little attention in the 
market. In 1958 a customer could still describe Paxmans as ‘a repair shop’144, and express 
surprise on learning that in addition to selling and repairing horns, the firm was also 
manufacturing its own instruments. Production levels remained modest and by 1959 Paxmans 
was making some 30 horns a year.  
 
The Paxman / Merewether partnership 
While Paxman’s capabilities in terms of the employee skill base had continued to develop, 
the firm was constrained in terms of technical capabilities by a lack of design knowledge and 
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expertise145. However, it was at this point that design expertise entered the picture, in the 
form of an Australian horn player now working in Britain. As a professional musician, 
Richard Merewether was what Von Hippel terms a ‘lead user’146, that is someone performing 
at the leading edge of his profession.  Merewether specialized in the high registers of the 
horn, among the most difficult parts of the repertoire to perform147.  He had studied at the 
Sydney Conservatorium of Music, where his circle of friends included the conductor Charles 
Mackerras, the violinist, Patricia Tuckwell and her brother, Barry Tuckwell148, who was later 
to become a horn player of international renown. Merewether followed Mackerras to Britain 
in 1950, with Tuckwell arriving shortly afterwards. By the late 1950s he was working as a 
freelance horn player in London where, as Robert Paxman observed, ‘… his bread and butter 
earnings when he was a player would have been in the theatres in the West End’149. In this 
role he, ‘made something of a specialization of very, very high register parts’150. But 
Merewether was unusual. Not only was he a highly talented performer with distinguished 
musical connections, he also had a keen interest in horn design based on new ideas about the 
physics and construction of the instrument151.  
In the mid-1950s Merewether persuaded Alexanders of Mainz to build him a horn to his own 
design specifically for his personal use. When in 1959 he wanted further modifications, rather 
than make the trip to Mainz, he got Paxmans to carry out the work152. The following year he 
returned with a new design, this time for a double descant horn in F/F-Alto.  Having learnt 
that Paxmans possessed the capacity to manufacture rotary valves in-house, he asked them to 
build it. As a ‘one off’ this particular instrument, built solely for Merewether’s own personal 
use playing pieces in the higher registers, it proved extremely effective. Gradually the word 
‘got around’153 about the outstanding performance characteristics of this Merewether 
designed, Paxman-manufactured horn. As another interviewee noted, ‘…Once the principal’s 
got one it’ll spread down the line and that’s enough to get the big cheese in the other 
orchestra interested’154. As a result Paxmans began making this horn in small numbers. 
The technical success of this instrument prompted further collaboration between the horn 
player and the horn makers, a relationship that was facilitated by Paxmans’ location in the 
heart of London’s entertainment district. As Robert Paxman explained, ‘He was a freelance 
professional musician operating around the West End doing all the musicals. You know, 
there was quite a lot in those days, so he had quite a bit of free time, which he was able to 
spend with us. So he gradually talked about new ideas starting from the basis of what we had 
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got …’155. In time this led to further additions to Paxmans’ product range including a similar 
instrument in Bb/F-Alto156. Whereas hitherto Paxman horns had been little more than copies 
of the Alexander horn, these new double descant horns represented genuine innovations in 
horn design. In addition to satisfying the increasing demand in Britain for German wide bore 
horns, they were meeting the need for more specialized instruments.  The new generation of 
horn players was being asked to perform an expanding and increasingly demanding 
repertoire, influenced by the work of leading horn players, especially Denis Brain who had 
done much to popularize the instrument in the early postwar years157. 
Paxmans’ innovative new horns were well received by professional horn players like Barry 
Tuckwell158. As one observed, ‘all descant horns that were made before Merewether came 
along did have flaws’159. Among other weaknesses, ‘they were difficult to play’ and ‘they 
were fairly out of tune’. The critical acclaim that greeted these instruments proved to be the 
prelude to a highly productive partnership between craftsman and horn player which was to 
last more than 25 years and lead to a succession of innovations in horn design. 
When Harry Paxman retired in 1961, Robert Paxman became the firm’s managing director 
and Richard Merewether, though still playing the horn professionally, joined him as a 
member of the board. Re-named Paxman Musical Instruments Ltd, Merewether was joined 
by two of the firm’s established craftsmen, Fred Leach and Ted Adams160. A catalogue161 for 
the firm from mid-1960s reflects the impact of the Paxman/Merewether partnership. It 
includes an expanded range of twelve horns (all German style rotary horns), termed ‘Paxman 
RM horns’, featuring, ‘the Merewether valve system … that provides minimum interruption of 
the air column’162. The catalogue went on to note that the horns were ‘of the highest quality’ 
and stressed their adherence to traditional artisanal methods of manufacture such as the use 
of, ‘hollow rotors built from tube and sheet metal as used by the finest German makers before 
the War, but now abandoned by them in the cause of mass production’163. 
************ 
Insert Figure 5 
************ 
Towards the end of the 1960s the Paxman/Merewether partnership unveiled another 
significant innovation in horn design. This was the world’s first triple horn164. Described by 
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the horn virtuoso Barry Tuckwell as, ‘an ingenious machine’165, it was an offshoot of the 
double descant horn and was pitched in F, Bb and F-alto. Constructed of three full sections of 
tubing Paxmans was able to keep the weight of the instrument down by using the hollow 
valves for which they were noted and which were a product of their outstanding 
craftsmanship. The triple horn proved a particular success in the United States, helping to 
establish the company’s reputation in North America for horns of the highest quality. It 
brought Paxmans to the attention of Osmun Music, a leading instrument dealership in New 
England who became an agent for Paxman horns166. The innovative features and outstanding 
quality of this instrument were even recognized in Germany. Among the leading horn players 
to adopt this horn in the 1970s was the German virtuoso, Herman Baumann (see figure 5). 
This was a significant step as Baumann was and still is internationally recognized as one of 
the world’s leading horn players. From this point onwards Paxman horns gained international 
recognition. As one of Paxmans’ employees at the time noted, ‘…Orchestras are probably a 
bit more like football teams than jazz musicians inasmuch as there’s a premier division and 
there’s a first division and a second division. All you really need is a few people in those 
orchestras. By that we’re talking LSO, Berlin Philharmonic, New York Symphony, Boston 
Philharmonic. They travel all over these world; local ones don’t’. 167Hence the introduction 
of the triple horn not only won recognition for Paxmans as an innovator in horn design168, it 
also marked the beginning of international recognition for Paxman horns169 as a leading 
brand of the highest quality and used by top international horn players. 
In 1971 Richard Merewether was forced by ill health to retire from horn playing. This 
provided him with an opportunity to work for Paxmans full time and gave added impetus to 
the Merewether/Paxman partnership. As a former employee170 at the time explained, key 
features of this unique partnership were, ‘Bob was the craftsman. He was good on sort of 
techniques of making things. He might not have been quite as good at everything is the 
impression I’ve got but he was good at the technical stuff. And Dick’s great thing was his 
ability to visualize, particularly being able to sort of figure out some of the significant 
points’.  
Paxmans continued to innovate by producing new horn models. A Paxman catalogue for 
1975171 reveals the product range had expanded dramatically with the company now offering 
no less than 36 different models of horn. With this extensive range of specially designed 
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horns Paxmans was able to meet the varied needs of professional horn players, and the 
company was now producing more than 200 professional quality hand-built horns per year172.  
This growth presented new problems, in particular around sub-contracting of production 
activities. However Robert Paxman was seen by colleagues as particularly astute in 
distinguishing, ‘which stuff you do in-house and which stuff you outsource so that your time 
is used effectively’173. In practice, a large proportion of the work was retained in-house. From 
a capabilities perspective, retaining control of production enabled the company to build horns 
of the highest quality, with horns produced at this time regarded as, ‘really good quality, an 
almost totally British made horn ... [built by] people who were really proud of their work’174. 
Not only did it enable Paxmans to ensure the highest quality, it helped to retain the 
manufacturing capabilities in the form of knowledge and artisanal skills that had been built 
up over more than 30 years.  
In 1985, the Merewether-Paxman design partnership came to an end with the untimely death 
of Richard Merewether. By then, the collaboration had produced some 50 horn models and 
was widely acknowledged as having made a major contribution to the development of the 
instrument175. Paxmans were now internationally renowned as makers of horns of the very 
highest quality. As a brand, it ranked alongside the world’s leading horn makers such as 
Alexanders and Kruspe. As a former employee explained, ‘…..they’d [Paxmans] become 
recognized within the UK as making very high quality horns …but by the late ‘80s and early 
‘90s they had become internationally recognized as pretty much the top’176.  
The firm’s position as one of the leading brands of French horn reflected the development of 
core capabilities over a long period. Foremost among these capabilities was the unique 
combination of traditional artisanal instrument making skills accumulated by its employees 
over many years allied to a highly creative design capability that drew on the first-hand 
experience of a lead user. Nor was this all, for these were complemented by other 
capabilities. These included managerial capabilities that centred on the pursuit of 
specialization, in particular Harry Paxman’s decision at the end of the Second World War to 
focus exclusively on the French horn, and company values that embraced both an active 
interest in musicianship and the pursuit of quality in manufacturing.  
Discussion  – contrasting visions and capabilities 
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This account has contrasted the fortunes of a large incumbent and a new entrant firm in 
brasswind instrument manufacturing in Britain over a period of five decades. Leonard-
Barton’s analytical framework, in particular her notions of ‘core capabilities’ and ‘core 
rigidities’, has much to offer in explaining the changes that took place, especially in terms of 
the market for horns in Britain. We have sought to trace the resulting patterns of capability 
development by combining a broadly Penrosean theoretical interpretation of the growth 
process with G.L.S Shackle’s key insight into human imagination in the entrepreneurial 
process.  Boosey & Hawkes pioneered the introduction of the German style horn in Britain in 
the 1930s, yet failed to capitalize on the knowledge gained by developing the instrument 
further. Instead this large and established firm replicated manufacturing practices that it first 
learned in in the pre-war period, but which became further entrenched as a consequence of its 
engagement in wartime production. Under the often erratic leadership of Geoffrey Hawkes, 
its core capabilities in manufacturing were largely oriented around process innovations in 
pursuit of mass production methods. Meanwhile, with Ralph Hawkes pursuing his own 
personal vision, much of the company’s entrepreneurial energies were devoted to building its 
international music publishing business. Secure in its dominant position in the brass band 
market, a product of the greatly increased market concentration that emerged following 
acquisitions in the 1930s and 1940s, the manufacturing operation in Britain was content to 
rely on standardized products, mainly popular instruments like trumpets and trombones.  
 
By relying on process innovations Boosey & Hawkes managed to lower unit costs, which 
was the managerial priority in the depression of the 1930s. However, this came at a price in 
that it demanded massive increases in the scale of instrument manufacturing, to justify the 
expense of mechanization.  Most operational processes (e.g. the use of hydraulic forming for 
pipework), were reduced to repetitive tasks, and were carried out by semi-skilled staff, rather 
than by specialists who had been through a brasswind apprenticeship.   As a result, 
instrument manufacture for the commoner models became primarily a matter of assembly.  
By the 1960s these core capabilities were fast becoming core rigidities. They had enabled the 
company to cater for mainstream customers such as the important brass band market, the 
lucrative educational market, and a growing export market177. However the gradual loss of 
traditional artisanal knowledge and skills meant that Boosey & Hawkes was unable to pursue 
productive opportunities in the growing international market for premium quality 
professional instruments. The folly of the company’s failure to invest in design and 
craftsmanship became apparent as its product began to experience increasingly intense 
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competition from volume manufacturers such as the Japanese firm Yamaha and its American 
counterpart Selmer. 
In contrast Paxmans focused on an entirely different set of core capabilities. Unlike the 
incumbent they specialized in a single instrument. Over a number of years they acquired and 
developed a range of craft skills, particularly in the field of valve machining and bell making. 
This, combined with recourse to entrepreneurial bricolage in order to make the necessary 
resources available within a relatively small business, gave the company the necessary core 
capabilities to secure a competitive advantage in producing instruments of the highest quality. 
Perhaps most important of all however was their ability to combine these distinctive 
manufacturing capabilities with novel insights into horn design.  
The partnership between Robert Paxman and Richard Merewether brought together 
specialised craftsmanship, design capability and a distinctive vision for this particular musical 
instrument. As one former employee observed, ‘Bob [Paxman] was the craftsman. He was 
good on… techniques of making things. He might not have been the quite as good at 
everything is the impression I’ve got but he was good at the technical stuff. And Dick’s great 
thing was his ability to visualize, particularly being able to sort of figure out some of the 
significant parts.’178 As a professional horn player Richard Merewether was able to draw on 
first-hand experience as ‘a high note specialist’179 tackling the most demanding pieces in the 
horn repertoire. By coupling this with an active interest in the scientific aspects of horn 
construction, he was able to make a decisive contribution as a lead user who was ‘well 
positioned’ at the ‘leading edge’ of contemporary practice180.  
This unique combination of skills, domain knowledge and technical systems formed the basis 
of Paxmans’ core capabilities over several decades.  When allied to the company’s distinctive 
values and embedded position within the horn community, they gave it a unique position in 
this industry sector.  Fuelled by Merewether’s passion for design and Robert Paxman’s 
entrepreneurial ingenuity, the company seized this productive opportunity to produce a steady 
succession of innovations in horn design. The new instruments met the needs of an expanding 
community of professional horn players, that reflected the emergence of a new generation of 
horn virtuosi181, and saw the horn increasingly used not just in classical orchestras but 
chamber ensembles and in the 1960s even in well-known recordings of popular music as 
well182. At the same time as a small company specializing in a single instrument they were 
able to provide professional horn players with the support required for a complex musical 
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instrument. As the former employee noted, ‘they [professional horn players] want to be able 
to fiddle with it and when you’re dealing with a small company, generally speaking you’re in 
a better position than you are in a big one’183. This helped give the firm credibility with 
serious musicians and in time helped create an internationally recognized brand184.  
The emergence of a small specialist firm like Paxmans is consistent with another aspect of 
the Penrosean theory of firm growth. Penrose argued that large, growing firms tend to focus 
on those activities/market segments where large scale operations provide them with the most 
profitable opportunities. In the process they leave other opportunities open, which  Penrose 
termed ‘interstices’185,  that small entrepreneurial firms can take advantage of by exercising, 
‘unusual ability, original ideas and considerable versatility’186. Thus, in the case of 
brasswind instrument manufacturing, by the 1950s Boosey and Hawkes had gained a 
dominant position in the mass market for popular instruments, but much of the company’s 
growth was focused on its publishing division.  As a consequence, the market for professional 
quality French horns represented just this kind of productive opportunity, which Paxmans 
were ready to pursue. Being a complex instrument, manufacture of the French horn was much 
less amenable to large scale operations, providing scope for a small specialist firm to enter 
the market and through developing its manufacturing and design capabilities, ultimately to 
prosper. There are also parallels with Carroll’s ‘resource partitioning model’, which has been 
used to explain the growth of micro-brewing in Britain and the US187.  In this model, large 
‘generalist’ firms meet a uniform demand for a standardized product through reliance on 
scale economies, leaving small ‘specialist’ firms to cater for niche markets by adapting 
themselves to the limited resources available. 
There is evidence that the Paxman story is part of a broader pattern in this sector and across 
other creative and craft-based industries, which has continued into the 21st century. During 
the course of the last 40 years several new entrants have emerged in musical instrument 
manufacturing, including a number of firms established by former employees of existing 
instrument makers. Notable examples in Britain are Rath Trombones and Smith-Watkins 
Trumpets. In both cases these are firms that specialize in a single brasswind instrument, 
producing very high quality products aimed at professional musicians. Nor is this a purely 
British phenomenon. In Italy, Paolo Fazioli set out in 1980 to design a piano that would 
sound superior to any other instrument on the international market188. Like Paxmans, Fazioli 
relies on a combination of artisanal skills and design expertise. Producing only 140 
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instruments a year his hand-made products are seen as embodying ‘true craftsmanship’189. As 
such, they are firmly aimed at the top niche in the market rivalling the leading incumbents, 
including the legendary Steinway brand.  Similar patterns are evident in other sectors where 
one finds distinctive market niches that include users requiring high quality, high 
performance products and where artisanal knowledge and skills are at a premium.  For 
example, in the sports equipment sector, several specialist manufacturers of bespoke, hand-
crafted cricket bats continue to operate successfully alongside much larger mainstream 
brands. 
Concluding remarks  
This article has made a theoretical contribution by responding to calls for historical 
examinations of entrepreneurial activity to adopt a more forward-looking perspective that 
Daniel Raff has described as, ‘a history of choices rather than outcomes’190.  The theoretical 
framing combined a long-established yet rarely applied Penrosean ‘productive opportunities / 
productive services’ dynamic with the radical subjectivism of Shackle’s ‘imagined outcomes’ 
and Leonard-Barton’s conceptualization of ‘core capabilities’ and ‘core rigidities’. This was 
used to analyse the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities and capability development in a 
manufacturing industry sector that has experienced increasing consolidation, and recourse to 
volume production, while at the same time witnessing the growth of specialist, craft-based 
businesses.   
Utilizing this theoretical framing a number of distinctive findings emerged from the empirical 
analysis. It was found that personal interests and passions were influential in driving the 
Penrosean productive opportunities/ productive services dynamic. In both of the musical 
instrument manufacturers studied, the personal interests of key players played a crucial role 
in terms of the entrepreneurial opportunities pursued and the capabilities developed. Thus 
Ralph Hawkes’ personal passion for contemporary classical music was shown to have exerted 
a powerful influence on Boosey and Hawkes’ development, in particular the way in which 
the publishing side of the business, especially its portfolio of contemporary classical 
composers, came to the fore. Similarly Richard Merewether’s interest in and enthusiasm for 
horn design, strongly influenced Paxman’s pursuit of the international orchestral market 
through a string of innovations in horn design. 
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Another aspect of the theoretical framing that found support in both cases was the cumulative 
influence of past decisions in shaping the capabilities and future direction of each business 
over time.  Thus Boosey and Hawkes’ pursuit of industry consolidation in pre-war years 
combined with an emphasis on volume production during World War Two, led to the 
company’s development of large scale production and the pursuit of mass markets in the 
postwar era. Similarly at Paxmans their pre-war involvement in instrument retailing and 
repair work, especially their location in the heart of London’s entertainment district, led to 
close relationships with professional musicians and this was to play a key part in the 
company’s postwar success as a specialist manufacturer of high quality orchestral 
instruments.  
As well as providing insights into entrepreneurial processes, especially opportunity 
recognition and exploitation and the development of capabilities, this article has wider 
implications. It contributes to the literature on musical instruments, a literature that is very 
extensive but dominated by technical and performance aspects of instruments. In this instance 
however the contribution is different, as it focuses on much neglected business aspects of 
musical instrument making. In the process it provides a valuable insight into the business of 
musical instrument design and manufacturing. In particular the Paxman story challenges 
many of the prevailing assumptions about craft production. These frequently fail to recognize 
the potential for innovation present in this form of production. In contrast the Paxman case 
reveals how small specialist craft-based businesses operating as traditional workshops can 
successfully co-exist alongside much larger industrial counterparts.  
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Table 1  Mergers of Brass Instrument Makers 
 
Date Acquirer Acquired Products Changes in activity 
1917 Boosey & Co. J R Lafleur & Son Manufacturer & 
importer 
n/a 
1925 F. Besson & Co. Quilter Not known n/a 
1930 Boosey & Co. Hawkes & Son Brass manufacturer Marble Arch plant 
closed & transferred to 
Edgware 
1930 Mayers & Harrison J Higham Brass Manufacturer Plant closed/ 
production ceased 
1940 F. Besson & Co. Wheatstone & Co Instrument 
manufacturer 
Manufacturing 
transferred 
1941 Boosey & Hawkes 
Ltd 
Rudall Carte & Co Flute & Brass 
manufacturer 
Plant closed 1939 & 
production transferred 
to Edgware 
1948 Boosey & Hawkes 
Ltd 
F. Besson & Co Brass manufacturer Plant closed & 
production transferred 
to Edgware 
1970 Boosey & Hawkes 
Ltd 
Salvation Army 
Brass factory 
Brass manufacturer Plant closed & 
production transferred 
to Edgware 
 
Source: Smith and Blundel “Improvisation and entrepreneurial bricolage”, 65. 
 
 
Table 2  Boosey & Hawkes production of orchestral horns 1935-54 
 
Year French horn  German horn Total 
1935 59 18 77 
1936 42 17 59 
1937 32 3 35 
1938 49 0 49 
1939 27 0 27 
1940-44  production displaced in wartime 
1945 15 0 15 
1946 4 0 4 
1947 28 0 28 
1948 3 18 21 
1949 18 18 36 
1950 17 30 47 
1951 39 18 57 
1952 19 8 27 
1953 18 34 52 
1954 30 29 59 
Total 400 193 593 
 
Source: Boosey & Hawkes archive, A227 Instrument books 
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Table 3  Boosey &Co: horn production 1920-39 
 (Boosey & Hawkes from 1931) 
 
Model Military 
horn 
 Orchestral  
horn 
Total 
Year A41 (Eb) A40 (Eb)  
1920 12 27 39 
1921 46 25 71 
1922 39 11 50 
1923 42 19 61 
1924 0 36 36 
1925 49 16 65 
1926 30 0 30 
1927 30 16 46 
1928 36 10 46 
1929 24 15 39 
1930 30 8 38 
1931 24 8 32 
1932 6 2 8 
1933a 11 9 20 
1934b 62 15 77 
1935 22 77 99 
1936 31 59 90 
1937 28 35 63 
1938 13 49 62 
1939 12 27 39 
Total 547 464 1011 
 
a In 1933 Boosey & Co’s A40 Orchestral horn began to be replaced by Hawkes & Son’s No. 
H1 Professional Raoux model. 
b In 1934 Boosey & Co’s A41 Military horn began to be replaced by Hawkes & Son’s No. H2 
Military and Orchestral model now designated as B4707. 
 
Source: Boosey & Hawkes archive, A227 Instrument Books. 
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NOTE: FIGURES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PRE-PRINT 
 
Figure 1 
French horn catalogue of Hawkes & Son, circa. 1930 
 
Illustration reproduced courtesy of Bate Collection, University of Oxford 
 
Figure 2  
British horn players of the 1920s 
 
Illustration reproduced courtesy of the Bate Collection, University of Oxford. 
 
Figure 3 
Boosey & Hawkes German horn circa 1935 (on the left) 
 
Illustration reproduced courtesy of the Horniman Museum and Gardens, London. 
 
Figure 4 
Boosey & Hawkes brass instrument production during World War Two 
 
Illustration reproduced courtesy of the Horniman Museum and Gardens, London 
 
Figure 5 
1st International Brass Congress at Montreux, 1976 
Willi Watson, Richard Merewether, Herman Baumann and Robert Paxman (left to right) 
 
Illustration reproduced courtesy of Mr Willi Watson 
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